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Book Review
Knowledge and Politics. By Roberto Mangabeira Unger.* New
York: The Free Press, 1975. Pp. 295. $12.95.
In fewer than three hundred pages, Professor Roberto Unger
attempts to do the following things: 1) give an account of the
main ideas which, since the intellectual revolution of the 17th
century, have informed our conceptions of nature, society, and
the human self, and show the interconnection among them, and
their relation to the dominant social and political institutions of
the modern state; 2) display the philosophical shortcomings of
these ideas, and the inadequacies of the actual institutional
arrangements to which they correspond; 3) present an ideal conception of the self and of society which captures the strengths,
while avoiding the weaknesses, of the modern (or as Unger characterizes it, the "liberal"1 ) intellectual tradition; 4) *identifythose
features of modern social and political organization that intimate,
in a cloudy and ambiguous way, the possible transformation of
the master institutions of the liberal state and the emergence of
a form of life in which Unger's ideal of the self would be adequately realized; and 5) place the birth and demise of liberalism
in the context of a theory of universal history. It is strange that
after so rich a feast, the reader is still hungry-without quite
knowing for what.
I.
In the first three chapters of Knowledge and Politics,Professor Unger is concerned with what he calls the "metaphysical"
aspects of liberalism.2 It is his aim, in these opening chapters,
to describe the conceptual foundations of liberal epistemology,
ethics, and political theory. This part of Unger's argument is
devoted to the analysis of a "set of interlocking conceptions"'3 or
ideas. According to Unger, these ideas, taken by themselves and
in abstraction, are only "the representation of a certain type of
social life in the language of speculative thought;" 4 in order to
fully understand them, it is necessary to articulate their connec* Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. R. UxGER, KNowLmGE Am PoLmcs 8, 11, 57-58 (1975).
2.

Id. at 5-6.

3.

Id. at 145.

4. Id.
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tion with liberalism as a mode of social existence.5 This latter
task, which assumes the form of an "historical inquiry"6 into the
structure and dynamical properties of liberal institutions, is taken
up in the fourth chapter of Unger's book. In his fifth chapter,
Unger sketches an ideal of the self and begins an account of how
that ideal might be realized in the world. The book's concluding
chapter continues this account, and integrates Unger's theory of
the self with the "historical inquiry" initiated in Chapter Four,
by suggesting how the conditions required for realizing the ideal
might emerge from the actual transformation of liberal institutions themselves. Although Unger's argument has a complex
organization, its main elements can be presented rather simply.
What follows is a summary account of the argument, or at least
of its more important and interesting features.
Liberalism, considered both as a set of intellectual propositions and as a real form of social life, achieved its definitive form
in the 17th century. As the liberal world took shape, its ideas
and institutions displaced those of an older world. The two interconnected ideas which informed the beliefs and attitudes of this
older or preliberal world were: 1) the idea that every being has
an "intelligible essence" or inherent nature that makes it one kind
of thing rather than another, and which can be apprehended by
human intelligence; 7 and 2) the conviction that what is natural
and what is normative or sacred are continuous and inseparable,
both in the individual person and in the world as a whole. The
first idea underlies the natural law tradition in Western metaphysics, and the second is at the root of all premodern forms of
religious consciousness'
The preliberal world was characterized not only by a peculiar
intellectual outlook, but also by a specific social institution, or
more precisely a specific principle for the arrangement of institutions-a "principle of social order."9 Unger entitles this the
"principle of estates."
The distinctive feature of the principle of estates is the union
of social circumstance and political or legal status. Within the
system of estates, every individual has a fixed social place that
governs almost the entirety of his life in society: the kinds of
5. Id. at 118.
6. Id. at 145.
7. Id. at 31, 41.
8. Id. at 158. Unger's account of the preliberal mind would have
been more complete if he had illuminated the connection between these
two ideas. For an extended discussion of the relation between the
natural and the normative in the pre-modern religious consciousness,
, THE PmLosoPHY or Smvnouc Fomws (1955); M. Emsee 2 E. CASSnuI
AND SocmTy
ADE, Cosmos. AND HsToRY (1959); 2 M. WEBmE, EcoNom
399-420 (1968).
9, liNGER, supra note 1, at 164,
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things he is expected to do and to know, the goods he possesses,
and the duties or entitlements he has. Membership in one's
estate is usually determined by birth. And each estate has a
legal definition, strong ties of internal solidarity, a limited set
of permissible jobs open to its members, and a type of power
or political representation that distinguish it from other estates.
Both European feudal society and what is described as the postfeudal European Standestaat or society of states exemplify the
principle.' 0
The principle of estates is the dominant preliberal principle of
social order. In the abstract way in which Unger formulates the
principle, it applies equally to European feudalism, the postfeudal Standestaat,the societies of Mediterranean antiquity, and
the great civilizations of Asia.11 The principle of estates reflects
in real life both the metaphysical doctrine of intelligible essences,
and the belief that what is natural and what is normative are
ultimately continuous. 12 It is this "totality"' 3 of ideas and
institutions that liberalism undermines and eventually replaces.' 4
According to Linger, all liberal ideas are built upon two basic
premises. The first is the denial of the preliberal conviction "that
all things in nature have intelligible essences" and that the
human mind is therefore able to "understand what the world is
really like."'
The rejection of the principle of intelligible
essences "leaves no stone of the preliberal metaphysic standing." 6
The second premise is expressed by the idea of
transcendence, which asserts the radical discontinuity of the
normative and the actual, or the 'transcendence' of the latter by
the former.' 7 This elementary notion assumes a variety of different shapes; but wherever it appears, the idea of transcendence
achieves the same fundamental effect by declaring the separation of what preliberal metaphysics so completely joins together:
the separation of the mind from the body, of the understanding

10. Id.
11. Of course, not all preliberal institutions rest upon the principle
of estates. Many are founded upon the principle of kinship. These two
principles, however, share in common their most important feature:
the ascription of formal rights and responsibilities to individuals on the
basis of their membership in certain groups to which they belong by
birth. See UNGER, supra note 1, at 164-65. It is therefore convenient to
regard the principle of kinship as merely a special case of the principle
of estates. With this proviso, one may properly describe the principle
of estates as the dominant preliberal principle of social order.
12. Id. at 229.
13. Id. at 125-33, 148.
14. Id. at 77.
15. Id. at 31, 77, 79, 119-20.
16. Id. at 32.
17. Id. at 158-64, 228.
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from the passions, of the state from society and society from
nature, and finally, of God from the world. The idea of transcendence marks a profound devaluation of everything worldly,
and leads inexorably to the disenchantment' s of the world itself.
Although the idea makes its initial historical appearance in the
religious sphere-as the remarkable invention of those "Near
Eastern salvation religions that fashioned the conception that the
world was created by a deity who stands above it"'-its consequences are felt in the very corner of our metaphysical picture
of the world and man's place within it.2o In the chapters he
devotes to liberal metaphysics, Unger attempts to show that
acceptance of the root premises of liberalism has important consequences for epistemology, ethics, and political theory, and to
demonstrate that in each case'these same consequences produce
a philosophical puzzle which resembles a contradiction (or

"antinomy") .21

Liberal epistemology, according to Unger, replaces the idea
that the world has an inherent order which can be adequately
grasped by human reason with the assumption that the order of
the world is itself generated by the creative and informing activities of our theoretical intelligence.2 2 Expressed in a more
familiar way, liberal epistemology asserts that every fact, or bit
of intelligible reality, is at bottom a theoretical construct. There
are no theory-independent facts or propositions. Reality itself is
theory-laden. Because this is so, there can be no neutral standard, no theory-independent Archimedian perspective from which
to evaluate the relative merits of different and competing theoretical constructs. Unger claims that by rejecting the doctrine of
intelligible essences, liberalism abolishes the independence which
nature (and the 'natural') enjoy in preliberal metaphysics, and
thereby undermines the classical conception of truth itself. Be18. M. WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FRom MAx WEER 139 (H.
Gerth & C. Mills ed. 1946); M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHNIc AN THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 180-83 (1959).
19. UNGER, supra note 1, at 158. See also M. WEBER, ANCIENT JDAISm 118-38 (1952).

20. For an account of the impact of the Judeo-Christian conception
of creation on our ideas of nature and natural science, see H. Jonas,
Judaism, Christianity, and the Western Tradition, CoMMENTARY, Nov.
1967, at 61-68 (1967). The consequences of this doctrine for political
theory are discussed in F. Oakley, Medieval Theories of Natural Law,
6 NATURAL LAw FORum 65-83 (1961). See also H. WARRENDER, THE
POLITIcAL PHLosoPHY OP HOBBES (1957).

21. Unger insists that the connection between liberal ideas resembles but is not a relation of entailment; likewise, he asserts that the
conceptual puzzles of liberalism look like, but are not, logical contradictions. See UNGER, supra note 1, at 12-16, 107.
22. Id. at 32.
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cause the very idea of theoretical reason requires a meaningful
notion of truth, the liberal theory of knowledge destroys itself.

Liberal ethics (which Unger divides into two main types, "the
moralities of reason and desire" 23), begins with a particular
picture of the self, and its various powers or faculties.
Reason or understanding is the faculty by which the self
determines what the world is like. The terms understanding and
knowledge also describe the pictures of things in the world produced by the use of reason. Desire or will is the faculty by
which the self determines the objects of its appetites and aversions. The appetites themselves are also called desires. A
choice is a decision about which of several courses of action to
pursue, when some of the courses of action are more capable
of satisfying a desire than others. An inclination is a predisposition toward certain kinds of desires and24toward things or situations capable of satisfying those desires.
On this view, which Unger attributes to the moralities of reason
and desire alike, reason is powerless to adjudicate between
choices, and is reduced to a merely instrumental role in which
its sole task is to discern the means for implementing a choice
which the appetitive or desiring part of the self has already made.
As a result, no reasoned justification can ever be given to establish the moral rectitude of a particular choice. From a moral
point of view, therefore, every choice is necessarily arbitrary.
According to Unger, the moral arbitrariness of choice is a consequence of the divorce of reason and desire-of the "is" and the
"ought," of fact and value-and at bottom such arbitrariness
is merely another facet of liberalism's thoroughgoing rejection of
the doctrine of intelligible essences.
Each of the two branches of liberal ethics attempts to save
choice from moral arbitrariness. The first branch (the morality
of desire, which may be loosely identified with the utilitarian tradition) seeks to achieve this result by defining the good as the
satisfaction of desire, and ethics as the discipline that instructs
us in how to achieve the good. The second branch (the morality
of reason, which Unger associates with Kantian ethics) asserts
that reason establishes the standards of right conduct and thereby
provides the touchstone for evaluating the morality of any particular choice. According to Unger, neither attempt is successful:
the former fails because it cannot provide criteria for distinguishing the morality of different desires, and the latter is capable of
generating only formal rules, which are utterly devoid of content
and therefore useless as guides in the concrete deliberations of
moral life. Liberalism is therefore unable to escape the conclusion that all choice is morally arbitrary. Just as theoretical
23. Id. at 49.
24. Id. at 39.
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reason becomes aimless in the absence of a coherent notion of
truth, practical reason is rendered senseless by the assumption
that the actual choices we make in our moral life can neither
be attacked nor defended by reason itself. Liberal ethics is as
self-destructive as liberal epistemology.
In Unger's view, liberal political theory suffers from a related
defect. Beginning with the assumption that individual human
beings are in permanent conflict with one another for control of
the relatively scarce means which may be used to attain the two
universally shared ends of material comfort and honor, it sets
itself the task of explaining how this conflict can be disciplined
and moderated in such a way that each individual may be permitted a maximum of freedom in the pursuit of his own "particular objectives, ' 25 without jeopardizing the system of cooperative work, of "human interdependence, ' 2 6 which makes men

"indispensable allies ' 27 in their joint struggle against the eternal
and nature-imposed conditions of scarcity itself. "A society of
individuals who seek to achieve their particular objectives and
to satisfy their needs for comfort and honor must be characterized
by mutual hostility and mutual dependence. Both hostility and
dependence are based on the nature of human ends and on the
scarcity of means to satisfy them."28 Preservation of individual
freedom, and its reconciliation with the requirements of mutual
'29
dependence are "the two fundamental problems of politics.
According to Unger, liberal political theory attempts to solve
both problems by invoking the idea of a system of impersonal
rules. If the rules of social association are impersonal, then they
do not embody or favor a particular conception of the good.
Impersonal rules are neutral as between the competing desires
of different individuals. Thus, while a regime based upon rules
of this sort is capable of establishing an effective public order,
in doing so it does not treat "one man's goals [as] worthier of
success than another's" 30 and thereby assures that order is "instituted in such a way that no one's liberty is unjustifiably preferred or downgraded and that everyone has the largest amount
of liberty compatible" 81 with a like liberty for others.
Any solution to the problem of social order which invokes
the principle of objective value does not take individual freedom
seriously. If we begin with the assumption that the world lacks
25. Id. at 65.

26. Id.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 67.

19761

BOOK REVIEW

an inherent moral structure, and that individual choices are
therefore morally arbitrary, we must accept the idea of a system
of impersonal rules as the only justifiable solution to the fundamental problem of politics. This is why one cannot embrace liberal ethics without also accepting the conclusions of liberal
political theory, and vice versa.
Unger describes the central dilemma (or antinomy) of liberal
political theory in the following way. In order to reconcile the
requirements of individual liberty and social cooperation, we need
a system of public rules which are both general and impersonal.
But how are we to define the categories of acts and persons which
the rules regulate? Or more precisely, how are we to justify any
particular description of the categories in question? There are
no criteria for evaluating the propriety of any proposed description or piece of legislation. Criteria of this sort cannot be found
in the idea of freedom itself (since that idea is too formal and
empty to be helpful), or in the utilitarian principle that happiness should be maximized (since that principle neglects to tell
us which interests shall be considered and how they are to be
weighted), or in the notion of a social contract (which, like the
idea of freedom, yields only empty generalities). Legislation
must be concrete and particular-it must do more than merely
state that order and freedom are to be reconciled. And yet whatever particular rules are enacted into law will benefit, unavoidably, "the purposes of some individuals more than those of their
fellows."3 2 It is the great weakness of the liberal theory of politics that it cannot provide any grounds for justifying this inequality in treatment. The inequality can neither be eliminated nor
legitimized.
The same problem repeats itself at the level of adjudication:
individual cases must be decided; they can only be decided by
appealing to substantive principles and purposes which are not
themselves part of the formal legal order; although these principles and purposes inevitably will favor some individual goals
over others, there are no grounds upon which this preference can
be justified. Thus, the solution which liberalism offers to the
"two fundamental problems of politics" reinstates, at the level
both of legislation and adjudication, the same arbitrariness which
the solution was designed to eradicate. In this sense, liberal
political theory is self-defeating.
According to Unger, the premises of liberal epistemology,
ethics and political theory share a common metaphysical root.
Each begins with the rejection of the doctrine of intelligible
essences, which asserts that truth and goodness "are standards
32.

Id. at 66-67.
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and goals of conduct that exist independently of human choice." 83
On this view, "men may embrace or reject [truth and goodness],
but they cannot establish or undo their authority."3 4 The doctrine of intelligible essences treats truth and goodness as objective
standards. Liberalism, by contrast, asserts their fundamental
subjectivity, construing every truth-claim as the product of a
theoretical construct and every moral decision as the result of
an arbitrary and groundless choice. But this assertion renders
unintelligible the very idea of an independent criterion by means
of which we might assess the truth of our theories and the goodness of our choices. By rejecting the doctrine of intelligible
essences, liberalism deprives us of the measuring rod which we
require in order to have some reasoned basis for deciding which
of our theories about the world are correct, and which of our
individual choices and public laws are morally good. This
jeopardizes the coherence of both theoretical and practical reason,
since the meaningful exercise of each depends upon the assumption that a reasoned basis of this sort exists, at least in principle.
Of course, we could avoid this dilemma by simply accepting the
doctrine of intelligible essences: but according to Unger there
are strong reasons for believing that doctrine to be false.3 5 On
Unger's view, liberalism properly rejects the doctrine of intelligible essenses; in doing so, however, it deprives human reason
of the objective standards which thinking, willing, and lawmaking require. The central question that liberal metaphysics poses
is whether such standards can be supplied without embracing the
preliberal doctrine of intelligible essences. It is Unger's contention that liberalism itself fails to provide a satisfactory answer.
Just as preliberal metaphysics has its real institutional reflection in the principle of estates, the liberal view of man and the
world also finds expression in a specific set of practices and institutions which taken together compose a unified "form of social
life."36 The "society of which the liberal doctrine is the theoretical representation" is the liberal state.8 7 "The liberal state is
the society established by the decisive social and cultural changes
of the seventeenth century that culminated in the French and
industrial revolutions."3 8 According to Unger, there is one
institution which is peculiarly characteristic of the liberal state.
This is the bureaucracy, which Unger calls "the master institu33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at
Id.
IU at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

76.
77-78.
147.
151.
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tion of the liberal state.' 's 9 The main features of the bureaucracy
are these:
First, the bureaucracy is committed to organization by
impersonal rules, but these rules may be explicit or tacit.
Second, a hierarchy of authority exists among the members of
the institution; there is an expectation that power will be exercised within the guidelines provided by the rules. Third, individuals in the institution have roles; there are specific jobs to
get done. These jobs are defined in a standardized way with
reference to their objectives and to the skills and talents they
require. From the standpoint of the institution, the most importhe abilities
tant thing about the individual is whether he has
demanded by the role to which he is assigned. 40
There are two principles of social order at work in the liberal
state. Each, like the principle of estates, may be regarded as "a
hypothetical rule for the disposition of individuals and groups in
social life ... as the actualization of a general conception of social
life." 41 The two principles are those of class and role. The "objective marks" of the principle of class are "the partial separation
of social and economic circumstance from legal and political
entitlement, and the preeminence of inherited and earned wealth
as a determinant of social circumstance. '42 Role, by contrast, is
the principle according to which social order is conceived and set
up as a division of labor. Within the division of labor there are
particular jobs; for the performance of each of them certain
skills and talents are required. Each role embraces a limited
and often small part of the life of the individual. Every individual occupies a plurality of roles, which he may view as entirely
disparate and as connected in his life solely by the fact that it
is he who occupies them. Birth operates in an indirect way by
distributing unequally both natural talents and opportunities for
the learning of skills. Nevertheless, merit-defined as the sum
of past efforts, learned skills, and natural talents-is the established ideal of the division of labor under the principle of role.
place are illegitimate
All other bases for the definition of social
from the perspective of that principle.43
Although the principles of both class and role inform the
social organization of the liberal state, they are in conflict with
one another.4 4 As the liberal state develops, its master institution
-the bureaucracy-increasingly dominates the organization of
administrative and economic life. Because its structuring principle is the principle of role, the triumph of bureaucratic organization marks the ascendency of role over class as the dominant
principle of social order. According to Unger, the principle of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

170.
150.
164-65.
165.
166.
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role is the ideal45 which the liberal state, the bureaucracy in particular, strives to realize in practice.
The meritocratic principle of role attempts to draw a sharp
line between the actual and the normative by declaring that the
social position which an individual ought to occupy should not
be determined by the group (the estate or economic class) into
which he happens, as a matter of fact, to have been born. This
aspect of the principle of role distinguishes it from both the principle of estates and the principle of class, and makes the principle
of role an ideal of individual freedom. Its insistence on the distinctness of the 'is' and the 'ought,' of fact and value, connects
the principle of role with the basic ideas of liberal metaphysics,
and in particular with the rejection of the doctrine of intelligible
essences. In each case, it is the primacy of the individual subject
that is emphasized.
While the principle of role advances a conception of individual freedom, according to Unger it violates that same conception
by making merit the basis upon which social positions are distributed.
One of the decisive elements of the conception of merit,
alongside skill and effort, is natural talent. But the distribution
of genetic endowments is absolutely capricious in the sense that
it is not itself a reward for anything. It is incapable of justification. In the absence of special conditions, which I shall mention later, the exercise of power by some men over others on
the basis of the natural allocation of talents must therefore come
to be felt as a surrender by society to the arbitrariness of nature
and as a submission by the dominated to the personal superiority
of the dominant. The brute facts of natural advantage are made
decisive to the distribution of power.4 6
The dilemma posed by the principle of role may be stated quite
simply: because the principle makes the organization of society
dependent upon certain naturally given talents and abilities, it
gives decisive importance to factors that must be regarded as
capricious and arbitrary from the perspective of the ideal of
individual freedom which the principle of role itself attempts to
express. Consequently, the principle of role exhibits the same
self-contradictory character as the main ideas of liberal meta-physics. Like the liberal theories of knowledge, moral conduct,
and political association, the dominant principle of social order
in the liberal state-the principle of role-abandons us to a predicament in which we are unable to avoid relying upon considerations which at the same time we cannot help but regard as
45.
46.

Id. at 165.
Id. at 169, 172-73, 273.
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arbitrary and unjustified. This is the antinomy
not only of liberal
47
thought but of the liberal state as well.
I have now sketched Unger's account of the liberal world and
its historical predecessor. The last two chapters of Knowledge
and Politics are devoted to a discussion of what he terms the
"postliberal"' 4 8 world. Although this postliberal world has yet
to assume a concrete historical form (and, indeed, may never
assume one), its constitution is intimated by certain developmental tendencies within the liberal state itself. In attempting to
form a rough idea of its contours and guiding principles, it is
essential that we begin by regarding the postliberal world as a
total form of social life, a "totality," which may be conceptually
distinguished from both its liberal and preliberal counterparts.
It would appear to be Unger's view that these three totalities,
taken together, exhaust the possible basic modes of historical experience. Presumably, the main task of any universal history
would be to describe, in detail, the connecting links which bind
these forms of life together while marking the transition from one
to the next.4 9
Because it is a "totality," the postliberal world has both a
metaphysical and an institutional aspect. The object of postliberal metaphysics is to resolve the antinomies of liberal thought
without resorting to the doctrine of intelligible essences.5 9 Put
somewhat differently, postliberal metaphysics seeks to provide a
determinate criterion for the evaluation of theories, choices, and
institutional arrangements which will not obliterate the notion
of individual autonomy that constitutes the great discovery and
main theme of liberal philosophy.5 The metaphysical scheme
which Unger outlines in his chapter on the theory of the self
represents an attempt to satisfy this requirement. Unger's argument goes something like this: 1) there is "a unitary human
nature, though one that changes and develops in history"5 2 ; 2)
if we assume that to "achieve the good is to become ever more
perfectly what, as a human being, one is,"5 3 then this "unitary
human nature" or "species nature" constitutes "the final basis
of moral judgment in the absence of objective values and in the
silence of revelation" 54 ; 3) taken together, the main attributes
47. Id. at 118.
48. Id. at 238.
49. Although Unger does not make this point explicitly, I believe

that his book contains the outlines of such a tripartite theory of universal history. See UGrm, supra note 1, at 226-31.
50. Id. at 194-95.
51. Id. at 238-40.
52. Id. at 221.
53. Id. at 227.
54. Id. at 221.
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of this "unitary. human nature" define "certain relationships
between the self and nature, the self and others, the abstract and
the concrete self" 55 ; 4) the "common character" of each relationship is that in it 'the conscious self. is opposed to and united with
.something external" 56; 5) a satisfactory account of our "species
nature" must therefore recognize that "the self is in fact distinct
from the world, and ought to become more and more independent
from it" and that the self is at the same time "part of the world,
57
and should increase progressively its union with the world" ;
6) it is possible to construct such an account of our "species
nature" out of intuitions and experiences gathered from our
everyday life.
The conclusion which Unger wishes to draw from this
argument is that his description of our "species nature" provides
a determinate standard for the evaluation of moral and political
proposals (and, presumably, for adjudicating certain theoretical
questions as well), without denying the importance of subjectivity
in human life. In this way, Unger's description purportedly
captures the great strength of liberal metaphysics-its commitment to freedom 8-and at the same time manages to overcome
its antinomies without appealing to the doctrine of intelligible
essences. The secret of its success lies, of course, in the fact that
the description itself incorporates subjectivity as one of the
constitutive elements of our "species nature."
In the last chapter of his book, Unger offers a rather detailed
account of an institutional arrangement that would adequately
express the synthetic principle of postliberal metaphysics developed in his ideal theory of the self.. Unger calls this arrangement
the "organic group." In- order for postliberal metaphysics to be
'brought down to earth,' the organic group must replace the
bureaucracy as the master institution of society. Unger describes
how this might happen, and then goes on to discuss some of the
central (and ineradicable) problems of "communitarian politics" 59-the politics of the organic group. He concludes with a
few brief remarks on the relation of philosophy to politics and
religion.
Unger's description of the structure of the organic group, and
its historical relation to the bureaucratic order of the modern
state, contains his fullest discussion of the concrete political problems associated with the distribution of wealth and power. Many
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

226-27.
•
227.
202, 227.
227.
284.
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readers will undoubtedly find this part of Unger's book the most
stimulating, or at least the most accessible, and there is a strong
temptation to test the adequacy of Unger's philosophical argument against the cogency and attractiveness of the practical proposals which he offers in his concluding chapter. Despite this,
I shall not discuss Unger's theory of the organic group in this
review. As Unger himself would admit, the truth of that theory
is dependent upon the truth of the philosophical ideas which he
elaborates in his critique of liberalism and in his ideal theory of
the self. Only after those ideas have been vindicated can Unger's
theory of the organic group be said to rest upon a secure conceptual foundation. In what follows, my attention is directed to
the philosophical, rather than the practical, aspects of Unger's
argument. I do not discuss the substance of Unger's theory of
the organic group because it contains no new philosophical principles, and throws little additional light on the key ideas introduced earlier in the book.
II.
Professor Unger's argument raises two important problems
of method. They are problems that Unger himself didcusses at
great length, and although it would be overstating things to say
that his entire project turns upon their successful resolution, like
all methodological problems, they pose threshold questions which
must be disposed of at the outset.
The first problem may be described in the following way. It
is Unger's contention that our thinking is today totally dominated
by a particular "vision" or picture of the world, which assumed
its "classic form in the seventeenth century" 60 and which, in certain respects, is seriously deficient. In order to demonstrate that
the liberal vision of the world is inadequate, it is necessary that
Unger be able to appeal to a standard or criterion against which
it adequacy may be measured. This standard cannot itself be part
of the picture whose adequacy is to be assessed; if it were, it
would lack the independence that permits it to function as a
standard of critical judgment in the first place. But if liberalism
is in fact a total picture of the world, how can we extricate ourselves from it sufficiently to achieve the Archimedian"1 independence required to assess its adequacy? 62 Either liberalism
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 86.
62. For a thorough discussion of the problem of the standpoint of

any total criticism, see G. HEGEL, SCIENCE OF LoGic 43, 60, 67-78 (A.
Miller trans. 1969); G. HEGEL, PmNOMENOLOGY OF MND 131-45 (J. Baillie trans. 1967); G. HEGEL, LoGic 27-28, 84-85, 86 (2d ed. W. Wallace trans.
1892).
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is a total picture of the world, in the sense that its principles
exhaust our capacity to think about or describe the nature of the
world and its contents, or it is not. In order to account for the
possibility of a "total criticism"6 3 of liberal ideas, Unger is forced
to make the latter assumption.
What is the Archimedian point from which liberalism is to
be, critically surveyed? According to Unger, the strengths and
weaknesses of liberalism are to be measured by comparing its conception of the self 4 with an ideal conception that adequately
describes the main features of the human condition.6" And how
is it that we come by this ideal conception? Unger maintains
that the liberal Weltanschauung is in fact erected upon a more
basic, and enduring, picture of man and his place in the world,
and that this basic picture has never been entirely obliterated
although it has been severely repressed by the triumph of liberal
ideas. 66 The ideal which Unger employs to criticize liberalism
is anchored in this basic picture, and the basic picture is in turn
anchored (or at least given expression) in our moral intuitions
and in the prereflective judgments of everyday life. 67 Reduced
to its sparest formulation, Unger's contention is that the virtues
of liberalism are to be measured by comparing its "picture of
humanity"6 8 with the one embodied in a particular set of
intuitions.
As Unger himself recognizes, there are difficulties inherent
in the appeal to moral intuitions as arbiters of judgment and
choice: "Where is the line between the correct intuitions and the
false ones to be drawn except by reference to the very theory
the intuitions are supposed to support?"'6 9 There is, however,
an additional reason why such an appeal represents a peculiar
embarassment in Unger's case. According to Unger, liberalism
begins with a rejection of the "doctrine of intelligible essences."
Unger argues that this doctrine cannot (and should not) 70 be
resurrected, and he acknowledges that any criticism of liberalism
which begins with an appeal to the doctrine of intelligible essences simply begs the question by assuming what liberalism
denies. It is therefore necessary that Unger disentangle his own
appeal to moral intuitions from the ontological premises on which
the doctrine of intelligible essences is based.
63. UNG R, supra note 1, at 1-3.
64. See text accompanying notes 22-28 supra.
65.

UNGER, supra note 1, 118, 191.

66.

Id. at 21-22, 196-99.

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 21, 55, 197.
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 77-78, 238-39.
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At first sight, this might appear to be a difficult task., For
while an appeal to moral intuitions may leave open many of the
ontological and epistemological issues which the doctrine of intelligible essences sought to decide, it does assume, in common with
that doctrine, the demonstrably self-evident truth of certain normative propositions. I do not wish to quarrel with this assumption; if appropriately qualified, it is an assumption which every
ethical theory must accommodate in one way or another. However, if Unger exploits the notion of self-evidence in his own
appeal to moral intuitions,
while maintaining that the theory of
"objective value"7' 1 is defective because it presupposes that "the
mind can grasp and establish moral essences or goods"172 (a fact

which "has never been shown"7 3), then there must be some additional and independent reason for rejecting the latter theory other
than the mere fact that it rests upon an appeal to the selfevidence of a particular normative conception.
There are two aspects in which Unger's ideal conception of
the self may be substantively distinguished from its liberal and
preliberal counterparts (as he describes them). In the first place,
Unger's conception attempts to reconcile the conflicting claims of
nature and freedom in human life, by giving due weight both
to our desire for autonomy or independence and to our need for
74
a satisfying union with others and with the natural world.
According to Unger, liberalism cannot adequately accommodate
the latter dimension of our humanity, and the preliberal conception of the self's relation to the world fails to accord the former
dimension a sufficiently important position. 75 It is the holistic
character of Unger's conception of the self which presumably
makes it preferable to either of the other two, and which gives
it its intuitive appeal. Each of us knows, from first-hand experience, the conflict that Unger describes; a picture of the self in
which the warring elements 76 are made to lie down with one
another in peace has obvious attractions. On Unger's view, these
attractions compel us to choose this picture over the one which
liberalism offers, and over the naturalistic picture that dominates
the preliberal world (and which is associated with the doctrine
of objective value).
Neither Unger's theory of the self, nor its use as a device
for criticizing the main ideas that Unger ascribes to liberalism,
71. Id. at 32, 77.
72. Id. at 77.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 21. See text accompanying notes 50-58 supra.
75. Id. at 31, 157-64, 180-81, 22676. I& at 24-28.
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represent philosophical novelties. Hegel long ago took Kant to
task on similar grounds.7 7 In fact, one of the principle aims of
Hegel's philosophy was to provide a satisfying account of the relation between freedom and nature, which would vindicate the
infinite worth of freedom while rescuing nature from the unhappy position into which (on Hegel's view) it had fallen in
Kant's critical philosophy.78 To be honest, I find very little in
Unger's "vision of humanity" which isn't already there-and for
the most part explicitly so-in Hegel's philosophy.7 9 Readers
unfamiliar with the history of modern philosophy, and in particular with post-Kantian German philosophy, are likely to
grant Unger's arguments more originality than they possess.
On page nine we are told:
The predicament to which liberal thought responds was a
central concern of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and to a lesser degree,
Spinoza, Rousseau, and Kant. My references to them, however,
are designed to illustrate rather than to prove their adherence
to the doctrines that are the subject of the critique. In this sense,
the critical argument remains hypothetical, the reconstruction
of a system of thought that their writings partially exemplify
rather than a study of the complexities and crosscurrents that

mark the development of an intellectual tradition.

77. See 3 G. HEGEI HISTORY or PHmosoPHY 462-63, 472 (E.Haldane
& F. Simson trans. 1896). See also G. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT

7f1-39 (T. Knox trans. 1952). G. HEGEL, PHENOM7NOLOGY OF Ml=
440-45 (J.Baillie trans. 1967).
78. This theme runs, implicitly, throughout the whole of Hegel's
system. Its most explicit formulations are to be found in his ENCYcLOPED A oF THE PimoSoPHcAL ScIENcEs. See G. HEGEL, LoGoc 180, 263-65,
377, 379 (2d ed. W. Wallace trans. 1892); G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY or
NATURE 13, 442-45 (A.Miller trans. 1970); G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
MND 18-19 (A. Miller trans. 1971). Commentators on Hegel stress
the importance of the reconciliation of free subjectivity and nature for
the Hegelian system. See, e.g., J. Findlay, Foreword to G. HEGEL, PHILLOSOPHY oF NATURE at xiii, xxv (A. Miller trans. 1970); G. MuRE, A
STUDY OF HEGEL's LoGic 299 (1950).
79. Compare Unger's views on the following subjects with Hegel's.
On self-consciousness: G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 218-67,
329-82 (2d rev. ed. J. Baillie trans. 1949); G. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF
MIND 153-240 (A. Miller trans. 1971); on science: G. HEGEL, PHENOmENOLOGY OF MIND 272-327, 446-53 (J.Baillie trans. 1967); on work:
G. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT 11 189, 190-208 (T. Knox trans. 1952);
on love: G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 473-75 (J. Baillie trans.
1967); G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT I 158-68 (T.Knox trans. 1952);
on art: G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MND 713-49 (J.Baillie trans.
1967); G. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF FINE ART (T. Knox trans. 1975); on
social interaction: G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 229-40, 501-06,
559-610 (J. Bailie trans. 1967); G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT f7
34-50, 65-71, 72-77, 142-57, 182-256 (T. Knox trans. 1952); G. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 244-91 (A. Miller trans. 1971); on the division of
198-208 (T. Knox trans.
labor: G. HEGEL, PHILOsOPHY OF RIGHT 7f7I
1952).
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This proviso is meant to insulate Unger from the objection that
his "reconstruction" does not faithfully reflect the ideas of any
particular theorist in the liberal tradition. Unhappily, Unger's
"reconstruction" is so schematic that at times it merely burlesques
the views of the great liberal thinkers; all of the interesting detail
is washed away, and we are encouraged to forget that the socalled "antinomies" of liberalism were themselves the subject of
considerable attention in the liberal tradition itself. 80 On occasion, Unger's "reconstruction" not only simplifies but positively
misrepresents the views of particular philosophers. I think this
is true, for example, in his brief account of the inadequacies of
the "morality of reason," where he accuses Kantian ethics of being
a barren formalism incapable of guiding us in our choice between
equally universalizable maxims, 81 and in his discussion of Hegel
and Marx, both of whom he characterizes as historicists and the
proponents of a naive and indefensible objectivism.

82

Such dis-

tortion is unfortunate because it masks some of the important
similarities between Unger's own ideas and the actual, detailed
views of those he is criticizing.
Of course, it is not necessarily an objection that one merely
repeats the ideas of other thinkers. If the ideas are true, their
repetition may be a service. However,; Unger's theory of the self
suffers from a greater defect than unoriginality. The theory is
vacuous as well.
80. See text accompanying notes 127-36 & note 123 infra.
UNGER, supra note 1, at 51, 53-54.
It would, of course, be
foolish to insist that Kantian ethics are not formal. Kant's stated
intention was to discover the "supreme principle of morality" which
underlies our common moral consciousness, and to explain how the
81.

same pure human reason could consistently be employed in both the
theoretical and practical spheres. I. KANT,FUNDAMENTAL PRmcInIPEs oF
VMETAHmsic or MoRALs 7 (T. Abbott transl. 1873). But although
Kant's ethics are formal, they do not, for that reason alone, lack content. Among the commentators on Kant's moral philosophy who have
discussed and dismissed the broad charge of "formalism" are J. RAWLs,
A THEORY OF JUsTIcE 251 & n.29 (1971); H. PAToN, THE CATEG OR CAL
IMPERATIVE 74 (1965); L. BECK, A COwnVENTARY ON KANTS CRITIQUE OF

PRACTICAL REAsoN 118 (1960). See text accompanying notes 130-133
infra.
82. UNGER, supra note 1, at 129-33. Both Hegel and Marx attributed a unique significance to the institutions and ideas of the modern
age, and believed that a scientific account could be given of the historical process which culminates in the modern world. Neither was an
historicist. See G. HEGEL, PmosoPHY OF IhSTORY 447 (J. Sibree trans.
1956); S. AvnERI, HEGIEL's THEORY OF TBE MODERN STATE 33, 65, 85, 88-91,
115-30, 221-38 (1972); M. Riedel, Nature and Freedom in Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right,' in HEGEL'S POLITICAL PmLosoPHi 136-50 (Z. Pelczynski ed. 1971); K. MARX, GUNDRISSE 105-06, 450-515 (M. Nicolaus trans.
1973); L. ALTHussER & E. BALBAR, RmimG CAIrFAL 119-44 (1970); A.
ScHm , THE CONCEPT Or NATu-E IN MARx: 19-126 (1971).
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In Unger's long chapter on the theory of the self, there is
little to object to. It is certainly true that we are at once natural
and nature-transcending creatures; that we crave autonomy and
at the same time community with our fellows (and that the one
is the condition of the other); that consciousness separates us
from the world, while work reunites us with it; and that each
of us is a unique bundle of particular attributes and abilities, and
at the same time a human being who shares or participates in
the universal powers of the species. But does this deepen our
understanding of the human condition and its predicaments?
Like a scientific hypothesis which is in principle incapable of falsification, 83 a theory of the self that simply recognizes the propriety of each of those implacable and conflicting needs which impel us toward the world and away from it, is true but unilluminating. 84 This is why Unger's theory of the self is ultimately dissatisfying-despite the passion and erudition that inform it.
The second way in which Unger's ideal conception of the self
is distinguished from its liberal counterpart is somewhat more
complicated, and turns upon a certain way of understanding the
metaphysical relation between universals and particulars. The
point is worth exploring in some detail, since on Unger's view
"all the fundamental issues of modern philosophy" are "expressions of the ...

problem of the universal and the particular."8 5

Unger contrasts two ways of thinking about the relation
between universals and particulars. According to one view, particulars are nothing but "fungible examples of some abstract
quality"8 6 or set of qualities, which we may call universal prop-

erties. We can think and talk about particulars only in so far
as they illustrate or embody some universal property; particulars
are intelligible only to the extent they are conceived as bundles
of universal properties-whatever is left over is strictly noncognizable since only universals can be known. Universals, by contrast, have an independent life of their own. According to this
first way of conceptualizing the relation between universals and
particulars, "abstract qualities take on a life of their own because
they are the sole possible objects of thought and language. Despite the acknowledgment that universals are abstractions or
conventions, everyone talks and acts as if they were real things,
83. For a discussion of falsifiability as a necessary characteristic

of any scientific theory, see K. POPPER, ThE LoGic Or ScnFrc DrscovsEY 40-43, 54, 78-92 (1959).
84. UNGER, supra note 1, at 137.

85. Id.
86.

Id. at 136.
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indeed the only real things in the world."8 7
On the second view,
the universal and the particular are equally real though they
represent different kinds of reality.

The universal is neither

abstract and formal, nor capable of being identified with a
single concrete and substantive particular. Instead, it is an
entity whose universality consists precisely in the open set of
concrete and substantive determinations in which it can appear.88
Unger illustrates this more complicated conception with the
example of an artistic style.8 9 If we ask ourselves what we
mean by "the Baroque," our initial answer might be "a definable set of techniques, methods, and modes of expression."
Such an answer would be inadequate, however; no determinate
set of characteristics could ever exhaust our conception of the
Baroque. Each Baroque artwork is an absolutely unique combination of stylistic attributes which discloses some new aspect
of the genre-of its meaning and potentialities. One way of expressing this would be to say that each individual artwork is a
perspectival interpretation of the concept of the Baroque; the
Baroque is merely our way. of describing the ideal unity of the
infinite series of perspectival views that "bring it to light. ' 90
Thus, although the Baroque, as a concept, has no existence apart
from the particular instantiations which disclose it (and is therefore not a "reified" universal), it nevertheless always outruns any
determinate series of particular works. There is always more to
the Baroque than we have yet seen. "The more we studied the
examples of the style, the better we would understand its spirit.
The study, however, would be fruitful only if one already had
in mind a conception of the animus of the style, the image of
reality and of man that unified its manifestations." 91
Regarding these competing conceptions of the relation between universals and particulars, Unger makes the following
points: 1) the first conception underlies and unifies the epistemological, ethical, and political branches of liberal metaphysics, and
is the ultimate ground of every antinomy to which liberal thought
87. Id.
88. Id. at 143.
89. Id. at 122.
90. This view of concepts is very close to Nietzsche's perspectivism.
For Nietzsche, the meaning of a thing or event or concept is determined
by the totality of the infinite perspectives that can be taken upon it.
"[Tjhe entire history of a 'thing,' an organ, a custom can in this way
be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations."
F. NrmrzscHE, THE GENEALoGy or MoRALs 77 (W. Kaufmann & R. Hollingdale trans. 1967). See also id. at 79, 80, 119; F. NrrzscHE, BEYOND GoOD
AND EviL 19-22 (W. Kaufman trans. 1966).
91. UwGER, supra note 1, at 122.
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gives rise; 92 2) the second conception is philosophically superior,
and provides the key to an adequate account of the self's relation
92. Id. at 133-37. The only philosopher who can even possibly be
said to have held this view in the simplistic form in which Unger outlines it is Plato. Among those philosophers identified by Unger as the
major proponents or founders of liberalism, only Rousseau did not deal
explicitly with the problem of universals. Of the others, none held the
view which Unger attributes to the tradition as a whole.
Hobbes's theory of naming states that a "common!' name "is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which
together, it is called an universal; there being nothing in the world
universal but names." T. HOBBES, LLiA.nAN ch. 4 (1651). These universal or common names are rules derived from particular instances.
Id. Hobbes did not believe that universals were the most real things,
and he did not "talk and-act" as if they were.
Locke holds that all knowledge is derived either from experience,
or from the mind's reflection on its own activity. . LocKE, ESSAY ON
HUIAN UNDERSTANDING 42-44 (A. Pringle-Pattison ed. 1924). "[Gleneral and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are
the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its
own use, and concern only signs." Id. at 230. "[T]he mind makes the
particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general,
which is done by considering them as they are in the mind such appearances, separate from all other existences and the circumstances of
real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is
called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings become
general representations of all of the same kind." Id. at 88-89. See also
id. at 22, 42-52, 215-16, 230-32. For Locke, universals are abstracted
from particulars; particulars do not receive their being through participation in universals.
Hume held that general ideas were an "impossbility." D. Huv,
A TREATISE

ON

HumAN NATuiR

24 (1888).

According to Hume, it is

only through custom that a particular idea becomes general in its representative employment. Id. at 17-25.
For a more detailed discussion of the views of Locke and Hume on
abstract or universal ideas, see J. BENN=,

Locxs, BEREEY, Hurm

(1971).
Spinoza viewed universals as a species of inadequate or confused
knowledge which is derived from particulars. "For it all comes to
this, that these terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused. It is
in this way that those notions have arisen which are called Universal,
such as Man, Horse, Dog, etc.; that is to say, so many images of men,
for instance, are formed in the human body at once, that they exceed
the power of the imagination, not entirely, but to such a degree that
the mind has no power to imagine the determinate number of men and
the small differences of each. ...

It will therefore distinctly imagine

that only in which all of them agree in so far as the body is affected
by them." B. SPINOZA, ETIcs Bk. 1I, Prop. XL, Schol. 1. See also 2
H. WOLFSON, THE PHILosoPHY OF SPINOZA 131-63 (1934).
Perhaps the most difficult and complex statement of the relation
between universals and particulars is Kant's. The entire Analytic of
the CaRriQuE OF PURE REAsoN is an extended discussion of that relation,
which Kant characterizes as the relation between the objects of our
knowledge and the concepts whch we use as rules for its organization.
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to the world, and the meaning of world history.9 According to
Unger, the second conception is superior for two reasons. First,
it accords particulars a kind of reality which the first conception
does not, by asserting that each particular advances our understanding of the universal in a way that no other particular can
precisely duplicate. This gives particulars an ontological independence they do not enjoy under the first conception, and makes
the dependence of universals on the particulars that manifest
them both more intimate and more complete. Second, Unger's
preferred conception permits us to understand how a universal
concept may have a history. The concept is brought to light in
time, as the (infinite) series of its particular embodiments
unfolds. Thus, we learn more about the concept as time goes
by. (I should point out that it is this feature of Unger's way
of conceiving the relation between universals and particulars
which give it its peculiarly modern cast, and which makes Unger's
According to Kant, "a concept is always, as regards its form, something universal which serves as a rule." I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PuR
REAsON *A106. The categories, or pure concepts of the understanding,
serve as the most basic functional rules for organizing the perceptual
data of experience. They do not function as criteria of reality or being;
rather, they serve to delimit and define the most general ways in which
we talk or think about objects, i.e., in terms of their quantity, quality,
relation, and modality. For example, we can say of any object, prior
to an actual experience of it, that it will be extended, have some shape
or other, some density or other, some color or other, will stand in some
relation to other objects, and, given certain limitations, that it will be
either a merely possible object or an actual one. The categories, then,
serve not to pick out particulars and give them being, but rather to
limit what can be said of any particular. It is for this reason that
Cassirer, following the use of functions in mathematics, has described
them as "rules for the production of the series" of particulars. E.
CASSin,
SUBSTANcE AND FuNcTioN 19-20 (1923).
On Kant's view, particulars can only be known after having been
organized or synthesized through the use of concepts; there has therefore been considerable debate among Kant scholars regarding the existential dignity of particulars in his epistemology. That debate, spanning almost two centuries, is too involved to summarize here. Its very
existence demands, however, that we view with skepticism Unger's cavalier assertion that a single way of conceptualizing the relation between
universals and particulars has dominated the whole of modern philosophy. See, e.g., G. HEGEL, GLAUBEN uND WissEN 13-40 (1962); G. HEGEL,
LoGic 82-94 (2d ed. W. Wallace trans. 1892); 1 A. SCHOPENHAuER,
THE WORLD AS WI.L AND REPRESENTATION 415-77 (E. Payne trans. 1958);
2 A. ScHOPENHAUER, T WoRn AS WILL Am REPRESENTATION 191-200
(E.Payne trans. 1958); M. HEmEGGER, WHAT IS A THING? (1967); 1 H.
PATON, KANT's METAPnySiC OF EXPERIENcE 70-71 (1936); 2 H. PATON,
KANT's METAPHYSIc OF ExsERIEucE 375-86, 404-25 (1936); P. STRAWSON,
TnE BOUNDS OF SENSE 247-73 (1966); R. WOLFF, KANT'S THEORY OF
METAL AcTrvnm (1963); 2 E. CASSIRE, DAS ERKENNTNISPROBLEM 664-82,
733-62 (1911).
93. UNGER, supra note 1, at 142-44, 234, 246.
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own identification of the conception with the classical metaphysicians quite misleading).94
Unger's conception of the relation between universals and
particulars recalls a familiar philosophical puzzle: 95 how are
we able to recognize a particular as the manifestation of a certain
universal, unless we are already acquainted with the universal
itself? Unger seems to recognize this important fact in his discussion of the relation between the "Baroque style" and its
various "examples." A study of the "examples of the style" could
be "fruitful only if one already had in mind a conception of the
animus of the style, the image of reality and of man that unified its manifestations." 96 The paradox, of course, is that while
a knowledge of the universal is required before particulars can
be seen or understood as manifestations of the universal, it is
only through these manifestations themselves that we come to
have a knowledge of the universal in the first place. It is true
that this paradox 97 raises difficulties for each of the two ways
94. In fact, Unger's preferred conception is closer to the views of
Kant and the Neo-Kantians, than to that of any other philosophical
tradition. The functional nature of concepts, their status as rules for
the production of a series of particulars, was first clearly expressed by
Kant. I. KANT, CRmQUE OF PuRE REASON *A68/B93. This view of concepts finds its most complete and cogent formulation in the works of
the Neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer. "The genuine concept
does not disregard the peculiarities and particularities which it holds
under it, but seeks to show the necessity of the occurrence and connection of just these particularities. What it gives is a universal rule for
the connection of the particulars themselves ....
[T]he characteristic
feature of the concept is not the 'universality' of a presentation, but the
universal validity of a principle of serial order. We do not isolate any
abstract part whatever from the manifold before us, but we create for
its members a definite relation by thinking of them as bound together
by an inclusive law."

E. CAssrasa,

SUBsTANcE AND FuNcTiO N 19-20

(1923). See also 3 E. CAsszER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SYNMoLIc Fomws
281-314. (R. Mannheim trans. 1957). "The particular, the discreet
value itself subsists only in reference to the part it plays in some form
of universal, whether by this we mean a universality of the concept or
of the object-and similarly, the universal can be manifested only
through the particular, and can be certified only as the order and
rule for the particular." Id. at 327.
A somewhat different form of this same general view is propounded
by Husserl. See 1 E.HussE=., LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONs 337-432 (J. Findlay trans. 1970); E. HUSsERL, CARTsSIAN MEDITATIONS
17-18 (D. Cairns
trans. 1970); E. HuSSERL, IDEAS f 131 (W. Gibson trans. 1931).

95. See note 97 infra.
UN ER, supra note 1, at 122 (emphasis added).
97. See PLATO, Mrwo 80d-81a. See also J. KLmxT, A CoMnvErTARY
ON PLATO'S MENO 90-92 (1965); J. Morvcsik, Learning as Recollection,

96.

in PLATO I 54-58 (G. Vlastos ed. 1971); J. FINDLAY, PLATO: THE
WPaTrEN AND UxWPITTEN DocTmn~s 125 (1974); B. Phillips, The Significance of Meno's Paradox, in PLATO'S MENo 77-83 (N. Sesonske & A.
Fleming ed. 1965).
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in which the relation between universals and particulars may be
conceptualized, and it might therefore seem appropriate to conclude that it does not give grounds for preferring one conception
to the other. I believe, however, that the difficulties are especially serious in the case of Unger's preferred conception, since
any philosophical explanation which would resolve the paradox
would at the same time compromise the very feature of that conception upon which its claim to superiority is based. If we must
know the universal in advance of its particular manifestations,
then it is difficult to see how the universal may be said to have a
genuine history, in the sense of being progressively better understood as the series of its manifestations unfolds. It will not do, of
course, to simply assert that the knowledge we have in advance
is a general and indefinite sort of knowledge, which is filled in
and given substance through our encounter with the universal's
particular embodiments. This would beg the question since what
we want to know is how a concrete particular can be seen as
the manifestation of a general concept in the first place. Unless
our advance knowledge of the concept is as detailed as the infinite
series of its manifestations, the paradox remains. Surely, Unger
wishes to avoid an idealist solution of this sort,98 since its metaphysical effect would be to take back a substantial portion of the
independence that particulars enjoy in his preferred conception
of the relation between particulars and universals. In fact, such
a solution would collapse the distinction between universals and
particulars, and on Unger's view would lead to "absurd ...
results."99
Does Unger's theory of the self avoid this difficulty? Unger
first sketches an ideal conception of the self and social association
in very general terms. This ideal represents the universal term
("humanity") which is brought to light in the unfolding series
98. The classic example of a solution of this sort is Leibniz's predicate-in-notion principle, the principle that in every true affirmative
proposition the idea of the predicate is "contained," either explicitly or
implicitly, in that of the subject. From this it follows that every substance has a concept so complete that a full understanding of it would
allow one to infer every predicate which would ever belong to that subject. "[I]t is in the nature of an individual substance to have such a
complete concept, whence can be inferred everything that one can
attribute to it." G. LnmrNz, THE ImnNz-ARNAuLD CoRRsro~NDcn 44

(H. Mason ed. 1967). See also id. at 51-52, 54-55, 61, 63-64, 84, 94;
Discourse on Metaphysics, in LEnmmz: SELEcTioNs 300-301

LEmrz,

(P. Wiener ed. 1951). For a fuller discussion of Leibniz's predicatein-notion principle, see B. RUSsELL, Tam PHIosoPHY or L=N=IE 40-53
(2d ed. 1937); G. MAsvN, Lnm-z: LoGIc AND METAPrYsics 126-33
(1960); C. Broad, Leibniz's Predicate-in-NotionPrinciple,in Lxmriz 1-18
(H. Frankfurt ed. 1972).
99. R. LINGER, supra note 1, at 139.
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of particular institutional arrangements ("history") that realize
the ideal in a more or less complete way. 100 We are then told
that there is a standard or criterion for determining which
arrangements reflect or embody the ideal, and which do not: by
applying this standard, we are able to recognize historical particulars as manifestations of our universal humanity or "species
nature."' 01 (Presumably, a similar test could be applied to
determine how fully a particular human being had realized his
humanity in the course of his own personal history.)' 0 2 The
standard that Unger proposes is this: arrangements adopted
under "certain political conditions" are to "carry weight as an
indication of the nature of man."'' 0 That is to say, we are to
presume that arrangements chosen in a particular kind of situa10 4
tion are more likely to manifest our "unitary human nature"'

than those chosen under different circumstances. Everything obviously turns upon the description of this preferred situation.
According to Unger, our confidence that arrangements adopted
in a particular situation do in fact manifest our true humanity
will vary in direct proportion with: 1) the inclusiveness of the
situation (the number of persons that it includes, and its continuity in space and time); and 2) the relative absence, in the situation, of all structures of domination. The second of these two
requirements is based upon the assumption that "whatever does
not arise from domination is human nature; domination is the
one form of social relations in which men's conduct fails to
express their being."' 0 5
Unger offers no justification for this last assumption. Perhaps he felt that it was uncontroversial, and did not require an
elaborate defense. There are thinkers, however, who have explicitly rejected Unger's assumption, and offered strong philosophical reasons for doing so. Nietzsche and Freud are only the most
dramatic examples.' 00 Consequently, the merits of Unger's proposed test for determining which arrangements manifest our
"true humanity" and which do not, would appear to depend upon
the merits of his substantive account of what our "true humanity"
actually is. While this dependence, taken by itself, does not constitute an important weakness in Unger's argument, it does
100. Id. at 195, 234.
101. Id. at 225-26.
102. Id. at 195.
103. Id. at 221.
104. Id. at 105.
105. Id. at 247.
106. See F. Niarzscm Tmi GsNERALO&y or MoRALS 26, 36-37, 42-43,
45, 47-48, 58-67, 84-88, 117, 120 (W. Kaufrann & R. Hollingdale trans.
1967); S. FRnU, CrinmATIoN AND 'rs DiscoNTus 41-45, 58-63, 70-92
(J. Strachey trans. 1961).
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underscore the fact that everything ultimately turns upon the
extent to which we find his ideal conception of the self powerful
and illuminating. For reasons already indicated, 10 7 I do not consider Unger's ideal conception to be a helpful guide in framing
either an intellectual or practical response to the irreconcilable
conflicts of human life. Unfortunately, this deficiency is not
remedied by the standard which Unger offers to assist us in
identifying the ideal's concrete instantiations-since the standard,
which is meant to supply the linkage between the ideal universal
and its particular manifestations, is itself dependent upon the
ideal conception for its own meaning and content. Because the
ideal conception is so schematic and formal, there is reason to
wonder whether it can supply the clues we require in order to
identify those concrete particulars which advance us toward the
ultimately unattainable goal of realizing the ideal on earth.
III.
The second important methodological issue raised by the
argument of Knowledge and Politics concerns the ontological
properties of the subject-matter of Unger's inquiry, or more
simply, the nature of his subject-matter and the kind of unity 08
which it exhibits. Unger asserts that he is offering an account
of "liberalism." But what is liberalism? What kind of being 1 9
does it possess? Is liberalism merely a complex set of philosophical ideas? Unger's emphatic answer is that it is not. Instead,
we are told, liberalism must be treated as a phenomenon belonging to the "realm of consciousness.""10 Like all phenomena
which belong to this ontological sphere, liberalism represents a
fusion of ideas and institutions. Unger describes the nature of
this fusion in the following way:
To grasp what a phenomenon of consciousness signifies as a
form of reflection, one must be able to describe the place it occupies in social relations. To understand it as a social practice,
a work, or an act, one has to describe what the participants, the

workers, or the agents think about it. The reciprocal link
between outward existence and inner reflection is called
meaning.",

In the realm of consciousness, "every social practice and institution is mediated through the categories of the mind, so that
the manner in which people understand a social arrangement is
107. See text accompanying note 78 supra.

108. UNGER, supra note 1, at 14.
109. Id. at 115-17. I follow Unger in deliberately using the onto-

logical term.
110. Id. at 108.
111. Id.
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an inseparable aspect of the arrangement itself."11 2 Now in
addition to the realm of consciousness, it is possible to identify
two other, and quite distinct, ontological domains. One Unger
calls the realm of events, the other the realm of ideas. This is
how Unger characterizes his three-tiered ontology:
There are three modes of being: one of events, one of social
life (which for some purposes can be called more narrowly a
field of consciousness, mind, or culture), and one of ideas. These
modes might be described respectively as the kingdoms of
nature, culture and ideal truth. To each type of being, there corresponds a method: causality to the first; appositeness or symbolic interpretation to the second; and logic to the third.112

Things or events in non-human nature may belong to either
of the first two modes of being (depending upon whether we treat
them as symbols "for some human concern"' ' or merely seek
to locate them in the causal chain of natural happenings).
Human conduct may also belong to either of these two modes:
"any act can be explained as a natural phenomenon by empirical
science, or it can be -interpreted as the counterpart to some kind
of belief."" 5 Finally, ideas may be treated as belonging to any
of the three modes: to the first, if "viewed as simply a psychic
event;"" 6 to the second, if viewed as the intentional correlative
of a particular act or social institution; and to the third, if
regarded solely as a concept or proposition "by which something
is predicated of something else or the objective validity or invalidity, truth or falsehood, of the predication"" 7 is asserted.
Unger appears to regard this "outline of a stratified ontology"' ' 8
as both accurate and exhaustive.
According to Unger, however, this ontology is not the one
which informs the liberal view of the world. Because liberalism
itself can only be fully understood as a phenomenon of consciousness, and because the ontology of liberalism does not recognize
the very mode of being to which all such phenomena belong, we
are required, Unger tells us, to reject the most fundamental
ontological principle of liberalism in order to describe and then
criticize it adequately.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 115-16.

114. Id. at 116. Unger recognizes that things or events may belong

to either the realm of events or the realm of consciousness depending
upon whether we treat them as symbols for interpretation or events in
a causal chain. This suggests that Unger understands the "ontological"
domains he describes to be spheres of meaning or intention rather than
spheres of being.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Unger describes liberal ontology as having two rather than
three tiers. In the liberal world, there are only two modes of
being: the realm of events and the realm of ideas. "There is
no conception more basic to the modern view of the world and
to the liberal doctrine which expresses that view than the distinc19
tion between the order of ideas and the order of events.'
In the liberal world, according to Unger, there is literally no room
for the phenomena of consciousness. Why this should be so is
somewhat unclear. Unger suggests that the inability of liberalism to acknowledge the unique ontological status of the realm
of consciousness is ultimately due to its rigorous insistence on
the distinctness of facts and values-a position that may be
regarded either as one consequence of rejecting the doctrine of
intelligible essences, or as merely another way of describing the
rejection of the doctrine itself.
The opposition of the order of ideas and the order of events
results in the impossibility of seeing the link between reflection
and existence in its true light. It forces method to choose
between the logical analysis of concepts and the causal explanation of facts, neither of which is suitable to the interpretation
of symbols. The psychological contrast of description and
evaluation dissolves the vantage point from which the two-faced,
factual and moral
20 aspect of the phenomena of consciousness can
be elucidated.'

Unger's description of the peculiar ontological properties of
the phenomena of consciousness, and his contention that they
exhibit a special kind of unity or bond-the bond of meaning
rather than that of causal connection or logical entailment-seem
to me to be both sound and illuminating (although certainly not
novel, as anyone familiar with the methodical writings of Max
Weber will immediately see) .121 What I find puzzling is his
assertion that the liberal distinction between facts and values
opens a chasm into which the realm of consciousness simply disappears, dissolving the "vantage point" from which the phenomena of that ontological domain may be "elucidated." I see
no inconsistency in maintaining, simultaneously, the truth of the
following propositions: 1) the world, or any of its constituent
elements, can acquire value and significance only through a
"spontaneous" act of valuation: in this specific sense, there is and
can be no such thing as an objective value; 2) there are things and
events whose being can only be fully explicated by taking into
account their valuation by one or more human beings (who either
may or may not be acting, thinking or willing with reference
to one another); 3) it is possible to interpret the meaning of
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 113-14 (emphasis added).
See 1 M. WEBEm, EcoNomy AND Soct'y 4-24 (1968).
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things and events of this sort by "sympathetically penetrating"
or "understanding" the intentional attitudes of those who have assigned a value to them; and 4) in order to do so, it is not necessary that the interpreter actually adopt as his own the values
in question: in this sense there need be no community of belief
between the interpreter and the person whose values he is attempting to understand. (A student of Jewish history need not
himself be a practicing Jew, or even a Jew at all.) If one accepts
these four propositions, it is possible to grant the truth of Unger's
account of the ontological constitution of the realm of consciousness, and affirm his claim that the method of symbolic interpretation is the only appropriate technique for describing and analyzing the contents of this mode of being, without violating in any
way the great liberal principle that facts and values (or description and evaluation) are entirely distinct. I am unsure how
Unger would respond to this. Perhaps he and I understand
the distinction between facts and values in different ways, or disagree about the philosophical consequences of the distinction. It
may also be that we have different conceptions of what interpretation means. (There are passages in which Unger seems to say
.that the interpretation of phenomena of consciousness requires a
"community of intentions"-which I take to mean a set of shared
substantive values---"between interpreter and interpreted.1122 If
this is in fact Unger's view, then we disagree quite sharply.) In
any event, it remains unclear to me why Unger's three-tiered
ontology, and the trilogy of methods to which it corresponds,
cannot be constructed out of materials which are already available in the liberal vision of the world.
IV.
The main elements of Unger.'s analysis and critique of liberalism will be familiar to readers who are well-versed in the history
of modern philosophy. Unger is not the first thinker to have
identified the so-called antinomies of liberal epistemology, ethics
and political theory-nor is he the first to have described their
common form. In fact, the problem which Unger identifies as
the central dilemma of liberal thought (the problem of articulating acceptable standards for theoretical and practical reason without appealing to. the doctrine of intelligible essences) is not merely
a difficulty which liberalism poses: it is a difficulty with which
liberal thought has been .preoccupied from its beginning. To
characterize the liberal tradition as the source of the problem is
only a half-truth; it would be equally correct to say that the
defining mark of liberal theory has been its continuing effort
122. See UNGER, supra note 1, at 114.
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to discover an acceptable solution. Whether this effort has been
successful is an open question. It is misleading, however, to suggest that a "total criticism" of the liberal tradition is necessary
in order to bring the nature of the metaphysical problem clearly
into focus. The great liberal thinkers understood and grappled
with the problem in a self-conscious manner. 123 By proposing
a way of reconciling our attachment to the idea of freedom with
the imperative need for objective standards in thinking and judging, Unger does not so much surmount the liberal tradition, as
acknowledge a shared commitment to its deepest and most abiding philosophical concern.
As I have already suggested, it is not a telling objection to
a particular philosophical position that it happens to lack
novelty-it is truth, and not originality, which counts in philosophy. Consequently, I do not regard the unoriginality of
Unger's "total criticism" of liberal thought as a serious defect (although I find his pretense of originality 124 unjustified and misleading). Unger's argument (I am almost tempted to say, his
"style" of argument) is more seriously flawed by the cavalier and
dogmatic fashion in which he dismisses many of the standard proposals for resolving the antinomies of liberalism. More often than
not, Unger proceeds by assertion rather than argument. If the
proposals he rejects are intended to resolve the same dilemma
to which Unger's own theory of the self is addressed, they deserve
a more careful and extended hearing than he gives them. Let
me illustrate what I have in mind.
In the middle of Unger's discussion of the antinomy of liberal
epistemology, the reader encounters the following paragraph.
Or again, when faced with a choice between two radically
different theoretical systems-for example, Newtonian and quantum mechanics-we hold on to standards of justification like the
power of the competing theories to predict events or to control

them. Such standards seem to be above the war of hypotheses.
But that too is an illusion. We must still interpret the results
of whatever experiments we perform and justify the methods of
proof we have chosen. If there are no intelligible essences, the
facts of the test experiment may mean different things in different theoretical languages. And the methods of proof will have
to be defended by their relation to purposes we have, whether
they be our interests in power over nature, in simplicity of

explanation, or in the corroboration of religious belief. Assume

for the moment that in the moral doctrine that develops the

implications of the denial of intelligible essences such interests

123. See, e.g., I. KANT, PROLEGOmENA TO Awy FuTuRE METAPHYSIcS
6-8 (L. Beck ed. 1950); I. KANT, PHmosoPHIcAL CORRESPONDENCE 252 (A.
Zweig trans. 1967); G. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 131-45 (2d
rev. ed. J. Baillie trans. 1949); T. HOBBES, LEv-mTHAN chs. 13-16 (1651).
124. UGEm, supra note 1, at 1-3, 16, 106-07, 146, 175, 190.
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are taken to be arbitrary, and you will see that the antinomy
of theory and fact remains unsolved. The apparent 25solutions
simply carry the riddle to a higher level of abstraction.1

Now it seems to me this argument rests on a confusion. Even
if it is true that the ideal of simplicity in scientific explanations
cannot itself be (morally) justified, it does not necessarily follow
that anyone actively engaged in the construction and verification
of scientific hypotheses is free either to accept or reject the test
of simplicity as a criterion for measuring the success of his particular theories. Max Weber made this point with characteristic

clarity: the value of science can never be demonstrated. Nevertheless, for one actually doing science-for the scientist-there
are certain definite yardsticks by which theoretical accomplishments must be measured. 12 6 Simplicity is arguably one of these,
since the object of any theoretical explanation is to identify the
general laws which operate in a multitude of particular situations.' 2 7 While it is possible to regard the scientific enterprise,
and the ideal of simplicity, as utterly lacking in moral worth or
meaning, the nature of the enterprise itself constrains those en-

gaged in it to treat simplicity as a standard of evaluation. The
great strength of this argument is that it does not require its proponents to abandon the liberal premise that every scientific con-

ception of reality is a theoretical construct. Whether one ultimately finds the argument convincing is less important than the
fact that Unger simply neglects to consider it.
A second example of this sort of philosophical carelessness
may be drawn from Unger's discussion of the morality of reason.
Unger contends that the morality of reason fails to solve the basic
antinomy of liberal ethics.
Coherence demands that the universal principles of the
morality of reason to be, like the golden rule, neutral toward
the purposes of specific individuals. Given the postulate of arbitrary desire, there is no basis on which to prefer some ends to

others. But as long as this formal neutrality is strictly maintained, the standards it produces will be, like the golden rule
itself, empty shells. Until the shells are filled up by more concrete principles, they are capable of accommodating almost any
125. Id. at 34.

126. M. WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FRoM MAX WEBER 140-48
(H. Gerth & C. Mills ed. 1946); M. WEBER, Objectivity in Social Science
and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOr.Y OF ThE SociAL ScIENcEs 49-112
(E. Shils & H. Finch ed. 1949).
127. See W. Qun=, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FRoM A LocicAL
PonT OF ViEw 20-46 (1961); W. QuIn, Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEw 65-79 (1961); P. Dumv, THE
An AND STRUCTuRE OF PHYsIcAL THEORY (1954); B. Russell, On the
Notion of Cause, with Applications to the Free-Will Problem,- in READINGS nT THE PHmLOSOPHY OF ScIENcE 401 (H. Feigel & M. Brodbeck ed.
1953).
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pattern of conduct and incapable of determining precisely what
is commanded or prohibited in particular situations of choice.
Do unto others as we would have them do unto us, but what
is that we ought to want them to do unto us ....
The decision
about what kinds of benefits to seek from the others, or which
commands and prohibitions to cast in the form of universal laws,
forces us to descend to the level of conflicting individual
goals
whose relative worth reason lacks authority to judge.128
Unger criticizes the morality of reason for its inability to provide a standard for distinguishing what is right from what is
wrong, and for its disregard for our "existence as subjective
beings with individual ends.' 29 If we assume, however, that
reason alone requires us to treat ourselves and other human
beings as ends rather than as means or things-and this is an
assumption which Kant not only made but defended' 30-then
neither branch of Unger's criticism holds up. Some actions surely
rest upon maxims which violate the imperative to treat every
human being as an end. It may be difficult to discern the maxim
that informs any particular action, and even more difficult to
decide whether the maxim in question satisfies the requirement
of respect for persons. But regardless of the substance of one's
ethical principles, there will always be practical difficulties in
their application: the morality of reason is no exception in
this respect. The important point to note is that the principle of
respect is sufficiently definite to permit us to distinguish
between and to judge the moral choices we actually make.
(For example, the principle tells us that the decision to lie to
another person is-in most cases-an immoral one.)131 At the
same time, the principle of respect maximizes the area within
which it is morally permissible to pursue ends of one's own choosing. Far from suppressing "our existence as subjective beings,"
this principle values and protects it in a fashion unmatched by
any other ethical norm. Again, my aim in sketching this argument is not to demonstrate its truth, but rather to restore to it
some of the philosophical vitality that Unger's summary dismissal
of the argument so completely obscures.
A final illustration may be drawn from Unger's discussion
of the antinomy of liberal political theory. According to Unger,
one response to the problem of legislation has been "the doctrine
of the social contract."'' 32 In one of its variant forms (in which
128. UNGER, supra note 1, at 53-54.
129. Id. at 54.
130. See I. KA=T, FuNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES Or THE METAPHYSIC Or
MoRALS

45-49 (T. Abbott trans. 1873); I.

KANT, CmQUE or PRACTICAL

REASON 180-81 (T. Abbott trans. 1873).

131. See L KANT, FUNDAAVEML PMNCIPLES OP
MoRALs 18-19 (T. Abbott trans. 1873).
132. UNGER, supra note 1, at 86.

T E METAPHYSIC Or
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it is coupled with certain utilitarian elements), the doctrine of
social contract
appeals to the conception of an ideal system of procedures for
lawmaking that all men might accept in self-interest and the
operation of which can be shown to lead to certain specific conwork
clusions about the distribution of wealth and power. The
of J. Rawls, the American moralist, illustrates this view.138
The problem with social contract theory (including the Rawlsian
version) is that it
presupposes the possibility of finding a procedure for lawmaking
to which any man, no matter what his values, would have reason
to agree. The more indeterminate the procedure in specifying
particular laws, the less would anyone have reason to object to
it. But, then, the problem of legislation would simply be postponed. On the other hand, the more concrete the procedure,4 the
less would it be likely to benefit equally everyone's wants.'s
I shall not defend Rawls-or any of the other social contract
theorists-against Unger's charge. It is important to note, however, that Rawls makes two claims regarding his celebrated
description of the so-called "original position": 1) the description
reflects our deepest, and most widely shared moral commitments and embodies values "to which any man ... would have
reason to agree;"' 3- and 2) the description is definite enough
to yield a specific solution to the "problem of legislation."' 8 6 If
these claims can be supported, Rawls's argument will have succeeded in doing what Unger asserts no social contract theory can
do-and while Rawls carefully develops his philosophical conception of the original position, and offers reasons for accepting it,
Unger merely declares the Rawlsian project to be metaphysically
incoherent. When compared with the richness and detail of
Rawls's own argument, Unger's meta-objection seems hollow and
unconvincing.
If Unger's "total criticism" of liberal thought loses much of
its philosophical force because of the casual and unnecessarily
abstract way in which it dismisses certain classical responses to
the antinomies of liberalism; it is further weakened by the thinness of its own ideal solution. Unger's strongest criticisms of the
liberal tradition might as easily be directed against his own theory
of the self: if we can reach any shared agreement as to what
our "unitary human nature" or "species nature" is, the substance
of our agreement must be so general and indeterminate as to be
incapable of providing a workable standard for adjudicating the
difficult questions which practical and theoretical reason pose.
133.

Id.

134. Id.
135.
136.

See J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-23, 201-04 (1971).
See id. at 119.
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This suspicion is borne out by Unger's actual account of the self.
There is little in that account which is objectionable, and equally
little that would be helpful in working through any really knotty
epistemological, ethical, or political problem.
It is also difficult to see-and this is a point which brings
me back to a problem noted earier 13 7 -how Unger can jusify the
appeal to intuition which he makes in constructing his own theory
of the self, without compromising the great liberal principle that
reality is always theory-laden and therefore (at least according
to Unger) subjectively determined. Of course, one may wish to
abandon this principle. It is difficult to understand, however,
how the principle may be abancdoned without at the same time
accepting one or another version of the doctrine of intelligible
essences. Certainly, an explanation is in order. Unger wants
objectivity, but without the doctrine of intelligible essences. He
asserts that this is what his theory of the self provides. But the
only response Unger has to the skeptic who challenges his account
of the nature of the self is to look within. 138 There is nothing
wrong with this response; it is, however, one which is equally
available to liberalism or any other theory.
I should not have been so harsh in my criticisms of Unger's
own philosophical ideal had Unger himself acknowledged the
extent to which that ideal is burdened with many of the same
metaphysical paradoxes that have exercised the great liberal
thinkers from Hobbes to Weber. Knowledge and Politics is a
well-written book, and contains much that is true. To the extent
that it reminds us of the enduring problems which must be confronted by anyone who would think about knowledge and politics
in a serious fashion, the book deserves our respect and praise.
However, to the extent that it casually dismisses liberalism's own
attempts to resolve the antinomies of theoretical and practical
reason, and too quickly replaces these attempts with a metaphysical ideal that gives the appearance of substance and novelty but
in fact lacks both-to that extent, Knowledge and Politics must
be approached with caution, and read with skeptical detachment.
Unger's seductive style and the architectonic quality of his argument make this a difficult task, but it is a task that intellectual
sobriety requires.

ANTHoNY T. Ko mAN**
137. See text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
138.
**

UNGER, supra note 1, at 198.

Assistant Professor of Law, 'University of Chicago.
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APPENDIX
The following is an exchange of correspondence between
Professor Unger and Professor Kronman, commenting on Professor Kronman's review of KNOWLEDGE AND PoLImcs.
September 22, 1976
Dear Professor Kronman,
Thank you [for your review of Knowledge and Politics;] it
contains several remarks that were useful to me. There is, however, one matter in it that baffles me. I would like to offer a
comment on it.
You say that both my general position and p-rticular arguments I make to support it can be found in the philosophy of
Hegel. The suggestion that my view is Hegelian has been made
by various people in the United States and England. Frankly,
I think it is mistaken, and that the mistake arises in part from
an inadequate understanding of Christianity and of the tradition
of Christian philosophy.
There have been philosophers, like Descartes, who were
Christian philosophers in the modest sense that they desired their
philosophy to be consistent with Christian doctrine and to work
to the greater glory of God. Others, like Aquinas, have been
Christian philosophers in the much stronger sense that their
philosophical doctrines are largely a reenactment, on the plane
of natural reason, of the themes of Christian dogma and spirituality. Hegel is perhaps in an intermediate category. So, in my
way, am I.
But if you compare carefully both the general position and
the detailed arguments of Knowledge and Politics with those of
Hegel's philosophy you will see that in every crucial respect my
position is much more orthodox than his. It is more orthodox
not only in the overall approach to the problems of immanence
and transcendence, universals and particulars, but in the specific
treatment of power, community, love, and indeed liberal society
itself. The Spinozism that runs through Hegel's philosophy is
clearly heretical, even, or perhaps especially, for a Protestant. As
a matter of philosophical discourse, my orthodoxy is neither here
nor there: the validity of the position must be based on
independent argument, which is what I tried to do in Knowledge
and Politics.
People interested in philosophy who have read the book in
Brazil, France, and Italy don't find it especially Hegelian at all.
They do find it very Catholic, and I believe they're right. What
is common to the Hegelian position and to my own-aside
perhaps from certain terminological conventions-is largely,
though not exclusively, the result of the shared background of
Christianity. The effort to participate in the dialogue between
Christianity and modernism is one of the ruling ambitions of the
work. And the primary source of the conception of universals
I defend is the Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught
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me as a boy used to call "hylemorfism" and which, despite what
you say, is utterly alien to the dominant strands in modem
philosophy.
I write this not merely to defend myself against an unfairness which I think you have done me, and to reject a misinterpretation of my thought, but also to make two points about the
politics of philosophical culture in the Anglo-American world.
First, I don't think one can understand correctly Christian
philosophers, even of the Descartes type, without coming to terms
with Christianity and Christian theology. Second, I believe that
the resources available for the critique of liberalism have been
enormously impoverished by the widespread ignorance of Christian tradition among contemporary Anglo-American academics.
One of the consequences is to subsume under some familiar category-like Hegelianism-or some even more general rubric-like
collectivism-whatever seeks to break with liberalism and capitalism. Hegel is one of their only remaining routes of access-and
a very oblique one at that-to the Christian vision....
Sincerely,
Roberto Mangabeira Unger
September 28, 1976
Dear Professor Unger,
May I respond to your
Thank you for your letter....
comment on Hegel and the Christian philosophical tradition?
The aim of Christian philosophy has always been to give a
rational account of God's relation to the world. But because it
seeks to vindicate a Christian attitude toward life, and at the same
time satisfy the rationalist impulse that animates all philosophical
reflection, Christian philosophy is marked by a deep tension.
To be a Christian means, above all else, to accept the
mysteries of grace and incarnation. Each, in its own way, bears
witness to the finitude of our human powers and to the experience of dependence which-on the Christian view-characterizes
our creaturely condition. Christianity requires its followers to
make a sacrifice of the intellect; the sacrifice in question is a very
important one indeed, since it concerns the most difficult question
posed by Christian doctrine: how is a relation between man and
God possible? The Christian attitude toward life demands considerable intellectual humility.
By contrast, the life of philosophy (as Aristotle so eloquently
describes it in the last book of the Nicomachean Ethics) is an
unashamedly self-sufficient and independent sort of life. To be
a philosopher in the Aristotelian sense (which is by no means the
same thing as being an Aristotelian) one must believe that the
most important things are transparent to human reason. This
is a profoundly unChristian view, a view which represents the
most attractive (and thus from a Christian perspective the most
dangerous) expression of human pridefulness. Nothing illustrates this more clearly than Aristotle's comparison of the practice
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of philosophy with the unconditioned motion of the prime mover.
To take this comparison seriously is to narrow, if not obliterate,
the distance between the human and the divine in a way that
no Christian can accept.
To the extent that it is motivated by a desire for philosophical
clarity and completeness, Christian philosophy must view the
central mysteries of Christian dogma with anxiety. Of course,
if it strives to rationalize these mysteries and succeeds in doing
so, it eliminates the anxiety: but only by ceasing to be Christian
philosophy. On the other hand, by making the intellectual sacrifice which Christianity requires, it ceases to be philosophical. It
is not surprising that this dialectical tension should itself have
become a powerful and recurrent theme in the Christian tradition.
I must admit that Knowledge and Politics struck me as a
religious book, but not as a particularly Christian one. It is true
that the theoretical concerns of the book grow out of the Christian
philosophical tradition: but so does the whole of modern philosophy. Doctrinal Christian belief plays no role-at least no role
that I can see-in the conceptual argument of the book. This
is not to say that the argument of Knowledge and Politics is
incompatible with the main principles of Christian dogmatics, but
only that its truth and intelligibility are not dependent upon
them.
Tf Knowledge and Politics is a Christian book, it is because
it denies the self-sufficiency of philosophical reason. You are
quite right to point out that in this respect the book is nonHegelian. There are no mysteries in Hegel's philosophy. Indeed,
his guiding philosophical ideal is that of a pre-suppositionless
totality, built up within the closed circle of a kind of thinking
which is dependent on nothing other than its own energeia. No
Christian can accept this view of the office and powers of
philosophy. I do not believe that you accept it.
Nevertheless I still find your book strikingly Hegelian, at
least so far as its substantive argument is concerned. It is only
at the point at which your substantive argument breaks off, and
your reflection on the limits of philosophy begins, that the book
assumes a decidedly non-Hegelian posture. I do not mean to belittle the importance of this aspect of the book, but since it falls
outside the domain of philosophy there is little that can be said
about it.
Perhaps I have misunderstood what you mean by Christian
philosophy. I think in any case that we read Hegel rather differently. (I am especially confused by your reference to Hegel's
"Spinozism." The similarities between their philosophical views
strike me as rather superficial. Think, for example, of their
respective treatment of the concept of freedom.) I do agree that
Hegel has been somewhat overused, and that Hegelianism has
become a blanket formula covering a variety of interestingly different philosophical views. But this is surely as much a function
of the widespread unfamiliarity with Hegel's writings as anything
else. More importantly, the absorption of Christian philosophy
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into Hegelianism may not be entirely unjustified. If some
philosophers are tempted to argue that Hegel marks the end of
the Christian tradition, it may be that they do so not out of ignorance of the tradition itself, but because they have correctly understood the laws of conceptual motion that have informed the
development and disintegration of Christian doctrine. To test
this proposition, it would be necessary, among other things, to
spell out the relation between radical Protestantism, Hegelianism
and European nihilism, and to set all of this against the original
Christian promise and the conception of a created world. These
matters possess great interest for me, as they obviously do for
you.... Although our philosophical views, at least on some
matters, are sharply different, I believe that our philosophical
interests are quite close.
Sincerely,
Tony Kronman
October 4, 1976
Dear Professor Kronman,
Thank you for your letter of September 28. Allow me to
make the following short observations.
1. Knowledge and Politics is not a Christian book merely
because "it denies the self-sufficiency of philosophical reason."
It is a Christian book because it affirms that mankind can progress toward the ideal (beatitude) in history but that they cannot
achieve it in history. The union of immanence and transcendence, the synthesis of the mode in which universals and particulars are merged and the mode in which they are separated, cannot
be fully realized in the world. This perspective is in turn associated with the Christian conception of man as embodied and
transcending spirit that is drawn directly from the theology of
incarnation and grace and which constitutes the core of the doctrine of the self I defend. It is a perspective crucial to the construction of both my critique of liberalism and my affirmative
arguments about power, community, and love.
2. The centrality of this theme of earthly incompleteness,
and its translation into concrete views about man and society,
sharply distinguish my position from Hegel's. The rejection of
this theme by Hegel is part of his Spinozism, a doctrine incompatible with Christian teaching.
3. Throughout his life, Hegel recognized the importance of
the Spinozist element in his philosophy. There is, for example,
the astonishingly frank and unequivocal statement of his late
years: "[T]hought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint
of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential beginning of all philosophy." The presumption that a man understands the character of his own work is certainly rebuttable, but
neither in Hegel's case nor in my own have you rebutted it to
my satisfaction.
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4. As to the "law of conceptual motion" which decrees that
Christianity will be absorbed into Hegel, the Amazon will flow
into the Charles and A.J. Ayer will become a convert to the doctrines of Plotinus before that happens. Because I am no
Hegelian, I differ from you in disbelieving in the existence of
"laws of conceptual motion."
I would be grateful to you if you would have our exchange
of letters published together with your review. In this way,
readers will be able to judge for themselves where the truth lies
in this matter that touches so closely in the nature of the ideals
to which my life as a thinker is devoted. This is an unusual
request. But it is also unusual for someone to be declared an
adherent to a school of thought he claims to reject.
Sincerely,
Roberto Mangabeira Unger
Professor Kronman replies:
1. Hegel's Spinozism. The "astonishingly frank and unequivocal statement" which Professor Unger quotes in order to
demonstrate Hegel's alleged Spinozism is drawn from Hegel's
Lectures on the History of Philosophy (a notoriously unreliable
text, constructed in good part from student lecture notes). The
passage from which the quotation has been extracted is this:
It is therefore worthy of note that thought must begin by
placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower
of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy. For
as we saw above [in the discussion of Eleatic philosophy], when
man begins to philosophize, the soul must commence by bathing
in this ether of the One Substance, in which all the man has held
as true has disappeared; this negation of all that is particular,
to which every philosopher must have come, is the liberation of
the mind and its absolute foundation. The difference between
our standpoint and that of the Eleatic philosophy is only this,
that through the agency of Christianity concrete individuality is
in the modern world present throughout in spirit. But in spite
of the infinite demands on the part of the concrete, substance
with Spinoza is not yet determined as in itself concrete.
A few pages later, Hegel remarks:
There is therefore no ground for the objection that Spinoza's
philosophy gives the death-blow to morality; we even gain from
it the great result that all that is sensuous is mere limitation,
and that there is only one true substance, and that human liberty
consists in keeping in view this one substance, and in regulating
all our conduct in accordance with the mind and will of the
Eternal One. But in this philosophy it may with justice be
objected that God is conceived only as Substance, and not as
Spirit, as concrete. The independence of the human soul is
therein also denied, while in the Christian religion every individual appears as determined to salvation. Here, on the contrary,
the individual spirit is only a mode, an accident, but not anything substantial.
In these passages, Hegel is making several points: 1) the
philosophy of Spinoza lacks the idea of individual freedom; 2)
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this idea is a Christian discovery, and is the foundation of all
modern philosophy; 3) in its unconcern with the individual,
Spinoza's philosophy resembles that of the ancients; 4) Hegel's
own philosophy is distinguished from Spinoza's by its recognition
of the idea of individual freedom; in this sense, Hegel is a truly
Christian thinker.
I should like to quote one final passage (this one from Hegel's
Philosophy of Mind, which forms the third part of his Encyclopedia of the PhilosophicalSciences). Hegel is talking about the
philosophy of Kant, and he says this:
As against Spinozism, again, it is to be noted that the mind in
the judgment by which it "constitutes" itself an ego (a free subject contrasted with its qualitative affection) has emerged from
substance, and that the philosophy, which gives this judgement
as the absolute characteristic of mind [i.e., Kantianism] has
emerged from Spinozism.
Hegel's system rests upon the philosophy of Kant, not Spinoza.
I do not believe that any serious student of Hegel would dispute
this. I have gone on at such length about Hegel's Spinozism only
because Professor Unger's quotation, taken by itself, is likely to
mislead the reader. My exchange with Professor Unger regarding Hegel's Spinozism has tended to confirm, in my own mind,
the charge I made in my review that his book treats too
cavalierly, and at times positively misrepresents, the views of the
classical liberal thinkers. If Professor Unger wishes to make
Hegel's Spinozism a test case for determining the accuracy of this
charge, I welcome the challenge.
2. Philosophy and Christianity. It is of course a Christian
idea that "mankind can progress toward the ideal (beatitude) in
history but that they cannot achieve it in history." On the Christian view, history lacks closure; human experience, to the extent
that it remains worldly and historical, must be forever incomplete. This conception of the limitedness of human experience is
as much a consequence and expression of the characteristic broken spiritedness of Christian humility, as is Christianity's denial
of the self-sufficiency of philosophical reason. Both have their
roots in the Christian doctrine of human finitude. Hegel believed
not only that philosophical reason is self-sufficient, but also that
the destiny of humanity could be-indeed, had been-realized in
history. In this sense, Professor Unger is right when he says that
Hegel was not a Christian thinker. One may believe very
strongly in the limits of philosophy; but as Hegel himself pointed
out, it is difficult to say anything philosophical about these limits.
Indeed, the attempt to do so may be self-defeating, since it
implicitly recognizes the power of philosophical discourse. For
one who wishes to insist upon the limits of the expressible, the
only consistent attitude may be the one recommended by
Wittgenstein at Tractatus 7: "What we cannot speak about we
must pass over in silence."

